My text review of 1314: the Year of Bannockburn by Callum Watson, published by Pen & Sword:
1314: the Year of Bannockburn is an in-depth new study of perhaps the most famous battle in Scottish history. As well as the battle itself, Dr Callum Watson highlights aspects that have been somewhat overlooked in previous studies, including preparations for the campaign and the reaction to the outcome.One of the most impressive features of this book is Watson’s meticulous build-up, drawing upon contemporary sources to explain the policy of Robert de Bruce (King Robert I) and Edward II on the eve of the Bannockburn campaign. Although the records are incomplete, it seems Bruce was unwell in the months leading up to the battle, and it may have been feared that he would not recover. That would explain both his concern with the succession, and absence from events in early 1314. Instead the Scots were led by his brother, Edward, although Bruce returned to take command at Bannockburn. He may have also passed sentence of forfeiture on all those Scots who remained outwith his allegiance, although the timing of this is uncertain.
The position of Edward II is easier to define. There is clear evidence of his growing concern at matters in Scotland, and intentions to lead a military expedition. To demonstrate this, Watson looks beyond the British Isles. For instance, in October 1313 Edward addressed letters to the Roman Emperor, Andronikos II, requesting the release of Sir Giles d’Argentan, who was in prison at Salonika. Giles, one of the most famous knights of his time, would act as Edward’s bodyguard at Bannockburn. The king’s desire to secure his release implies that Edward specifically intended for Giles to serve on a Scottish campaign.
Furthermore, Edward was alarmed by complaints brought by his Scottish allies, led by Sir Adam Gordon and Patrick Dunbar, Earl of March. These throw light on the chaotic situation in Scotland prior to Bannockburn. Edward’s Scottish allies were not only being attacked by the Bruce Scots, but also the English garrisons at Berwick and Roxburgh. One of these ‘English’ officers was in fact a Scot, Thomas Pencaitland, son of a man who had defected to Edward I. Such pleas give an idea of the shifting allegiances in Scotland, in which all sides preyed on each other. It was Edward II’s thankless task to restore order, which he promised to do by advancing ‘against our enemies and rebels in those parts’.
The available evidence suggests that Bruce simply meant to stay out of Edward’s way, wait for the English king to run out of patience and money, and then resume terrorising English garrisons once Edward was forced to withdraw. This strategy had served Bruce well on Edward’s previous Scottish expedition, in 1310, and there was no obvious reason to abandon a winning strategy. To quote one chronicle, the Vita Edwardi Secundi:
“…but always as the English army approached he [Bruce] kept to the trackless boggy mountain places, into which such an army could not easily penetrate…”
Edward II was also driven by domestic concerns. In England he faced a serious challenge from the Ordainers, a group of nobles and prelates who wished to force Edward to reform the abuses of his government. Watson argues that the Bannockburn campaign was really an excuse for Edward to get away from the Ordainers, as well as improve his own political capital by winning a great victory in Scotland.
Watson provides a detailed account of the preparations for the campaign on both sides. Considerably more detail survives for the English side, thanks to the existence of so many administrative records. These include details of victualling, supply and wage accounts and other financial arrangements generated by the Exchequer at Westminster. Less information survives for the Scottish side, and Watson has to (reasonably) speculate as to the size of the army Bruce could field at Bannockburn.
The focus on administration may sound dry, but they make for a fascinating contrast between the two kingdoms. England in the late 13th century was a powerful centralised state, with a sophisticated bureaucracy set up to handle financial and military matters. Scottish governance was far more decentralised, meaning there was no fixed bureaucracy in any one place. This was a major advantage, since it meant there was no one town or region that the English could seize, which would enable them to take control of the Scottish administration.
The military aspect is, of course, the main focus. Watson describes how Bruce operated a scorched-earth policy, and from 1312 launched repeated raids into northern England. These were meant to hammer home the point that Edward II could not defend his kingdom, and to exploit the political turmoil in England surrounding Edward’s hated favourite, Piers Gaveston. The raids were brutal, although Bruce’s men tended to kill only those who resisted them.
This wasting or ‘guerilla’ strategy, typical of medieval warfare, was plied with lethal skill. Previous Scottish raids had been chaotic affairs, but Bruce’s efforts were systematic, organised and highly disciplined. Apart from spreading terror, they were designed to extort payments from the local populace, in the shape of what Watson refers to as ‘the three C’s’; cattle, cash, and corn. Discipline was important for then purpose of blackmail, since the English would not pay over large sums if they thought they were going to be robbed anyway.
Turning to the battle itself, Watson closely examines Bruce’s preparations in the weeks before the event, and his innovative use of the landscape to secure victory for the Scots. He ably examines each famous episode of the battle in turn, beginning with the skirmish at the New Park, where divisions among the English leadership triggered a disastrous cavalry charge into a series of specially dug pits. To quote the text:
“A contrivance full of evils…holes with stakes, so that they may not pass without disasters.”
This unpromising start was followed (allegedly) by the famous duel between Bruce himself and Sir Henry de Bohun. Watson, always even-handed with sources, points out that the earliest version paints Bruce in a distinctly unheroic light, killing Bohun as the Englishman tried to escape a Scottish ambush. It was John Barbour, writing decades later, who wrote the popular tale in which Bohun surprised Bruce while the latter was inspecting his troops. Another version, written by Sir Thomas Grey, states it was one Piers Mountforth whom Bruce killed, rather than Bohun. However, the existence of three independent accounts suggests there may be some truth to the tale.
The fight at the New Park was followed by a second skirmish, in which the English mounted chivalry were once again worsted by Scottish spears. Following these disasters Edward II attempted to move his army onto the Carse of Stirling, beyond the tidal streams (called ‘pows’ by the Scots), and the only firm land where his army might camp. Thus, even before the battle started, Bruce had left his enemy with few viable options.
On Monday 24 June 1314, after hearing mass, the Scots deployed in rectangular blocks of footsoldiers, with their long spears pointed in the direction of the enemy. This was in contrast to the oval-shaped formation used the previous day, and by William Wallace at the disastrous battle Falkirk in 1298; another example of Bruce’s tactical flexibility. To the shock and dismay of the English, the first two Scots divisions moved forward, when they were expected to stay rooted to the spot.
This meant Edward’s army was trapped between two streams, the Bannock Burn and the Pelstream, squeezed into the cramped space where the waters flowed together. Their only way out was to hack through the dense formations of Scottish spears, but English cavalry charges proved ineffective against the tight discipline of the Scottish infantry. The English archers briefly threatened to turn the tide, as they had at Falkirk, but were scattered by Scottish cavalry. The death of the Earl of Gloucester, probably killed during the initial charge, was a further blow to wavering English morale.
The destruction of the archers meant the English had no hope of extricating themselves from Bruce’s trap. At the crucial moment, when Bruce judged the enemy to be at breaking point, he threw in his reserve of hardened troops from Carrick, the Western Highlands, and the Hebrides. According to Barbour, these men were joined by the ‘rabble’ of the Scots camp, spreading panic among the already hard-pressed English.
At this point the English army broke and fled in all directions, reduced to a mob of terrified fugitives. Edward II himself was almost captured, and owed his escape to the courage of Giles d’Argentan, who dragged the king from the field before returning to embrace death. Some of the fleeing English tried to scale the steep sides of Castle Hill, but most followed their king south, abandoning the baggage and royal treasury. Many were trampled and drowned in the mud and water, although most of the nobles got away, accompanied by bedraggled or ‘naked’ Welsh infantry. One of the captured English knights had the interesting name of Sir Marmaduke Thweng; even better, his arms consisted of three green popinjays. He and another prisoner, Sir Ralph Monthermer, were treated courteously by Bruce.
Watson’s nuanced reconstruction of the battle is followed by an equally skilful analysis of the aftermath. The desperation of Edward II’s position is shown by the loss of his privy seal, left behind in the rout. Humiliatingly, he had to borrow the privy seal of his wife, Queen Isabella. Bruce then returned Edward’s own seal, both as a way of emphasising the parity between the two kingdoms, and a stinging reminder of Edward’s recent defeat. Elsewhere Edward was obliged to deal with ransoming prisoners taken by the Scots, including Scots alienated from the Bruce regime.
Watson emphasises that Bannockburn was not decisive. Edward II would recover, and lead an even larger army into Scotland in 1319; as usual, to no great effect. Meanwhile the Scots pressed their military advantage, mounting ever more destructive forays into the northern counties, now completely exposed to Scottish raids. After Bannockburn the extent and ambition of these raids were far greater. Edward II, in stark contrast, was unable to mount any kind of effective response. Eventually northern communities switched to making private deals and truces with the Scots, and even recognising his title as ‘regis Scoiae’ - King of Scots. These endless disasters, coupled with Edward II’s increasingly tyrannical regime in England, eventually led to his deposition and probable murder.
Within Scotland, Bruce’s position was still not secure. In 1320, despite repeated victories over the English, he was faced with the so-called Soules conspiracy, organised by the rump of his domestic enemies, the Balliol and Comyn factions. The executions and forfeitures that followed not only eliminated this threat, but provided Bruce with more lands to distribute to his loyal supporters. Even so, plenty of Scots lords were still unwilling to accept the Bruce regime, and would go on to form a body of men called ‘the Disinherited’. These men would play a key role in triggering the Second War of Scottish Independence, which almost witnessed the collapse of the fledgling Bruce regime, only a few years after Bannockburn.
Overall, this is a highly readable and precise account of a famous battle, written with verve and energy and an obvious passion for the subject. Watson mixes his undoubted scholarship with a clear and precise writing style, managing to convey knowledge and understanding of the sources without bogging down the text in fine detail. Anyone with an interest in this tumultuous era of Scottish history, and the astonishing rise to power of the Bruce dynasty, would do well to start here.
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